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Is it time to abolish Canada’s ties to the monarchy? Can we move beyond 
“responsible government” and parliamentary democracy? These are 
questions raised, perhaps indirectly, by these two books. 
 Following the October 2008 federal election, Canada experienced a 
remarkable series of political events. Faced with the threat of a non-
confidence motion and the prospect of a Liberal-New Democratic Party 
(NDP) coalition supported by the Bloc Québécois (BQ), Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper sought and received the prorogation of Parliament after it 
had sat for a total of only thirteen days. Once Parliament reconvened seven 
weeks later and the Conservative minority government introduced its 
budget, the Liberals blinked and the coalition fell apart.  
 Thus, with Governor General Michaëlle Jean’s acquiescence, 
Harper’s Conservative minority government was able to dodge the non-
confidence threat and carry on, subsequently winning a majority 
government in May 2011. This episode raised serious questions about the 
practice of responsible government and the role of the governor general 
(GG). Apart from these constitutional issues, the proposed Liberal-NDP 
coalition was an unprecedented partisan development in federal politics. 
These two books examine these events by focusing on one aspect of the 
crisis, namely the constitutional and the partisan. In doing so, they provide 
much to reflect upon, but wider issues remain unexamined.  
 Peter H. Russell and Lorne Sossin have assembled an impressive 
roster of scholars to address the constitutional aspects. Former Governor 
General Adrienne Clarkson provides a short but interesting foreword. She 
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doesn’t directly address the 2008-09 events, but decries the “abysmal lack 
of knowledge about the system” exhibited by the public and the media (ix). 
This becomes a major refrain throughout the book. 
 In his chronology of the events, journalist Michael Valpy questions 
whether they deserve to be called a “crisis.” As Valpy describes, “The 
country at no time was at risk of tumbling into bedlam and anarchy. 
Whatever the governor general’s decision, someone would have been given 
her nod to govern Canada legally; unless, of course, no political party or 
group of parties could claim Parliament’s confidence, at which point she 
would have authorized another election to be called. That is how the 
system works” (4). In a sense, Valpy is correct.  
 Framed differently, however, Andrew Heard argues that the extent 
of the public and media miscomprehension of responsible government,1 
the confidence convention2 and the role of the governor general,3 suggests 
that it was “quite worthy of being called a crisis” (47). The seeds of this 
crisis predate the Harper government. Gary Levy points out that these 
events were “the culmination of repeated abuse of the most important 
principle of responsible government, the confidence convention” (19). Paul 
Martin’s Liberal minority government repeatedly postponed opposition 
days to avoid potential non-confidence votes in April and September 2005 
and continued to govern after it lost two votes that the opposition 
considered confidence measures.   
 The ability of Martin and Harper to play fast and loose with the 
principle of responsible government is undoubtedly related to this lack of 
understanding of our system of governance. Most of the contributing 
                                                 
1
 The basic definition of responsible government is “government by a cabinet answerable to, 
and removable by, a majority of the assembly” (Forsey 2010, 3). 
2
 “If the House of Commons votes want of confidence in a cabinet, that cabinet must step 
down and make way for a new government formed by an opposition party (normally the 
official Opposition), or call an election right away so the people can decide which party will 
govern.” (Forsey 2010, 27). 
3
 The Constitution Act, 1867 (formerly the British North America Act) does not mention the 
prime minister, cabinet or responsible government. It outlines a system in which executive 
power is held by the governor general, acting on behalf of the Queen, but with the advice of 
the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada which is itself summoned (and removed) by the governor 
general. Guided by constitutional conventions, executive power has in fact been wielded by 
the prime minister and cabinet. The GG’s role is thus highly, but not completely, ceremonial. 
“The Governor General and the lieutenant governors have the right to be consulted by their 
ministers, and the right to encourage or warn them. But they almost invariably must act on 
their ministers’ advice, though there may be very rare occasions when they must, or may, act 
without advice or even against the advice of the ministers in office” (Forsey 2010, 33).  
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authors agree that Harper benefited from, and cynically contributed to, this 
state of affairs. Thus, Lorraine E. Weinrib’s argues that “Harper played on 
the ignorance of the Canadian public as to the constitutional framework 
within which our parliamentary system of government operates” (67). 
 In fact, it was Harper’s actions and rhetoric that precipitated the 
crisis. Certainly, it was the content of the Conservatives’ Economic and 
Fiscal Update on 27 November 2008 that led to the proposed coalition. As 
the global economy plunged into a major recession, the government 
decided to suspend the right to strike for federal public sector workers, 
eliminate legal channels for federal public sector workers to enforce pay 
equity rules and scrap public subsidies for political parties. These actions 
were apparently included in the government’s financial update due to the 
direct intervention of the prime minister himself (see also Savoie 2010, 
132). Meanwhile, the government offered no economic stimulus and even 
forecast a small budgetary surplus over the next two years.  
 None of this, of course, amounts to a crisis. The government was 
fully within its rights to introduce a contentious fiscal update. The Liberals, 
NDP and BQ were also within their rights to work together to defeat the 
government and replace it with a governing coalition supported by a 
majority of MPs. Had the opposition defeated the government and formed 
a government, or had the government marshalled sufficient votes to defeat 
the non-confidence motion, one could say that rather than being a crisis, 
the system of responsible government had worked. Non-confidence votes 
are not a crisis, but responsible government in action.  
 The situation only reached an actual crisis point when the prime 
minister misrepresented the actions of the opposition parties and sought 
the prorogation of Parliament. Harper argued that “Stéphane Dion does not 
have the right to take power without an election” (11) and described the 
coalition as an “undemocratic seizure of power” and “an illegitimate 
government” (13). In his televised address on 3 December, Harper stated 
that “the Opposition does not have the democratic right to impose a 
coalition with the separatists they promised voters would never happen” 
(15). All of these statements are blatantly wrong and misleading 
interpretations of the Westminster model of parliamentary government.  
 Then, in asking Michaëlle Jean to prorogue Parliament, Harper 
placed her in a very awkward position. By constitutional convention, the 
GG normally follows the advice of the prime minister, but this request was 
designed to undermine another constitutional convention. By seeking to 
close down Parliament in order to avoid a non-confidence motion, Harper 
was subverting the principle of responsible government.  
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 While critical of Harper’s actions, the authors are divided in their 
reaction to the governor general’s decision to grant the prorogation of 
Parliament. C.E.S. (Ned) Franks supports the GG’s decision, as do Jean 
Leclair and Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens. Franks points out that “no 
governor general has ever refused a prime minister’s request for 
prorogation” (33). In this specific case, he points to the fact that the 
Conservatives were able to sway public opinion against the proposed 
coalition. Perhaps public opinion did influence the GG’s decision, making it 
easier for her to defer to the prime minister rather than take the bold step 
of refusing the request. But does that make it the right decision from a 
constitutional perspective? Franks suggests that if he was refused 
prorogation, Harper would have waged a political campaign against the 
governor general. Again, this sort of logic hardly justifies the granting of 
prorogation.  
 Taking a different stance, Lorraine E. Weinrib avoids the question of 
whether the GG should have refused the prime minister’s request, instead 
placing the blame on Harper for making the request. Andrew Heard agrees 
that Harper’s prorogation ploy was “unconstitutional” (54) and “a 
fundamental abuse of power” (55), however, he also argues that the GG 
could have, and should have, refused the request. Heard insists that the 
governor general “had a duty to ensure that Parliament continue sitting” in 
order to allow MPs “to pass judgement on the government” (59). Brian 
Slattery similarly notes that “the principle of responsible government is 
not self-administering. It requires the active participation – indeed 
intervention – of the governor general” (87). While understandable from 
the perspective of the British parliamentary tradition, this position is 
ultimately unsatisfying from a socialist perspective, for reasons I’ll outline 
below. 
 Shutting down the House of Commons was only one aspect of 
Harper’s survival strategy. He also engaged in an aggressive attack on the 
proposed coalition. Minority parliaments and coalition governments are 
topics taken up by various authors. Lawrence LeDuc provides an 
introduction to coalition governments in seven other countries.4 The 
underlying message being that coalition governments are a common 
occurrence in multi-party democracies and, to quote Graham White, “not 
                                                 
4
 Since the publication of the book, a coalition government has been formed in Britain 
following the 2010 general election. As Britain headed toward an expected minority 
parliament, Canada was cited and studied as an example of a “dysfunctional minority 
parliament” to be avoided rather than emulated (see Chalmers 2009).  
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the devil’s work” (154). Unfortunately, a similar overview of coalition 
governments at the provincial level in Canada is not forthcoming (but see 
Marchildon 2006). As LeDuc points out, coalitions are a “practical 
alternative” in a minority situation offering stability and a broader base of 
support thus being more representative of public opinion (132). The other 
authors agree on these positive features, however, they don’t really 
address how a coalition government might come to exist in Canada. It 
might make sense, but that doesn’t mean it’s going to happen. In fact, 
coalition governments have probably been made less likely by the 
controversial events of 2008-09.  
The editors in their introduction and David R. Cameron in the 
concluding chapter take an optimistic view of the outcome of the 
prorogation crisis. Despite their real concerns, Russell and Sossin suggest 
that the crisis sparked beneficial levels of interest and debate over our 
political system.5 Cameron argues that the Conservative government had 
to back down from the controversial aspects of their fiscal update and 
produced a budget that reflected the demands of the opposition. Thus, the 
system worked. Yet, considering the damage done to the principle of 
responsible government, it is hard to share this optimism. 
 In How We Almost Gave the Tories the Boot, Brian Topp provides a 
political take on the prorogation crisis. An NDP insider, he presents an 
engaged and partisan analysis. He acknowledges that his goal is to “balance 
the books” (15) and keep the coalition option open for the future. While 
focused on the events of 2008-09, he provides interesting autobiographical 
anecdotes from an active career in politics as deputy chief of staff to 
Saskatchewan Premier Roy Romanow, head of the federal NDP campaign 
war room and national campaign director. Along the way, he provides an 
engaging read and many insights on the political process and politicians 
including Romanow, Jean Chrétien, Stéphane Dion and Bob Rae.  
Topp makes it clear that the NDP had a long-standing interest in the 
possibility of coalition government. During the 2004, 2006 and 2008 
election campaigns, with the likelihood of minority governments, the NDP 
considered all options for obtaining some direct influence in Parliament, 
keeping in mind the Ontario Liberal-NDP accord of 1985 and coalition 
governments in other countries. 
                                                 
5
 Despite the possibility or threat of another coalition and the unprecedented rise of the NDP 
during the campaign, voter turnout moved only marginally upward to 61% of registered voters 
in the 2011 election.  
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After the 2004 election, Layton approached Prime Minister Paul 
Martin about working together. Without the balance of power, the NDP 
lacked leverage. Eventually, the NDP joined talks which had already begun 
between Harper and Duceppe. Together, a package of amendments to the 
Throne Speech was developed. On 9 September 2004, the three opposition 
leaders sent a letter to Governor General Adrienne Clarkson describing 
their “close consultation” and calling upon her to consult with them in the 
context of a request for dissolution (34). Harper was poised to become 
prime minister with Bloc and NDP support.6 Ultimately, Layton decided not 
to support Harper becoming PM and the NDP soon worked with Martin, 
influencing the 2005 budget. 
During the 2006 campaign, the NDP looked for policy grounds to 
work with either the Conservatives or the Liberals. They thought that 
Harper might support electoral reform in exchange for support on justice 
and accountability issues, but again, the NDP did not gain the balance of 
power. By the 2008 campaign, Layton was intent on “turning the tables on 
Mr. Harper by using Harper’s own proposed parliamentary manoeuvres to 
replace him” (46-47). During the campaign, Layton openly mused about 
working with the other parties to defeat the Conservatives and by election 
night, the NDP had prepared letters for Dion and Duceppe proposing 
cooperation. Clearly, the NDP was working to build a coalition well before 
the Economic and Fiscal Update.  
Topp explains the NDP’s motives in terms that are alternately banal 
and revealing. He claims that “For the New Democratic Party of Canada, 
these events were in essence pretty much what they appeared to be: a 
good attempt to rid the country of a Conservative government and to 
replace it with something better” (177). Layton saw the opportunity to 
achieve “Canada’s first partially NDP federal government – his basic goal as 
federal leader” (69). More revealing is Topp’s admission that “I liked the 
idea that the federal NDP would have a direct role in the government for 
many reasons, a key one being that it would change the federal NDP, by 
giving it direct exposure to the realities of government” (123). This is an 
interesting insight into Jack Layton’s NDP and the attempt to turn it into a 
pragmatic party of government, particularly now as it settles into its new 
role as the Official Opposition.  
                                                 
6
 In the 2011 federal election, Harper warned voters of an opposition coalition, while the other 
leaders, in particular, Duceppe insisted that Harper’s anti-coalition rhetoric was hypocritical 
considering these past efforts at Conservative-NDP-Bloc cooperation.  
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Topp provides an inside account of the coalition negotiations. The 
NDP aimed for one-third of cabinet with the hope that this “would provide 
us with a regionally balanced team of experienced NDP ministers that 
Canadians would be able to imagine running the country, perhaps in a 
larger role after the next election” (82). In policy terms, the NDP sought 
measures to deal with the economic downturn (financial stimulus, 
infrastructure spending, sectoral aid to the manufacturing and forestry 
sectors, improvements to EI), increased child benefits and child care, and a 
commitment to discuss a North American cap-and-trade system. The NDP 
downplayed corporate taxes and the Afghanistan mission, two important 
areas of policy differences with the Liberals. Interestingly, Topp writes that 
“we wanted the policy accord to spell out the New Democratic Party’s 
commitment to fiscal responsibility…That meant a commitment that the 
budget would be rebalanced once the economic crisis was mastered” 
(126).  
 The NDP was remarkably comfortable with the idea of Stéphane 
Dion becoming prime minister. As Topp admits, “the idea of making Dion 
prime minister seemed less ludicrous to some of us than it seemed (as it 
turned out) to many other Canadians” (80). He points to the popularity of 
the Clarity Act among many New Democrats, glossing over Layton’s own 
misgivings. That said, having previously announced his resignation, the 
NDP expected Dion to be replaced as leader. As it happened, the Dion camp 
saw the coalition plan as a second chance, a way to salvage his leadership. 
If the coalition offered Dion the hope of a potential lifeline, the reality was 
that Dion, in return, weighed the coalition down like an anchor.  
As one would expect, Topp is highly critical of Harper’s actions. He 
argues that it was “entirely inappropriate, democratically illegitimate, and 
improper in 2008 for the prime minister to direct an appointed official, the 
governor general, to instruct the majority in the House of Commons on 
when it can sit or what business it can conduct, so that the prime minister 
could avoid a confidence vote” (182). Topp insists that the prime minister 
must respect the principles of responsible government. At the same time, 
he is careful not to criticize the GG’s decision. Without taking a position on 
the reserve powers of the Crown, he suggests that “if it is true that the 
governor general must do the prime minister’s bidding, then a heavy 
responsibility lies on the prime minister to tender ‘advice’ to her that is 
appropriate, democratically legitimate, and proper” (183). Like Andrew 
Heard, Topp considers the prorogation, in the context of a threatened non-
confidence vote, to be a dangerous precedent. 
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Some of Topp’s other criticisms of Harper are surprising. Topp 
portrays the Conservative proposal to end public subsidies to the political 
parties as an “attempt to reintroduce big money to federal politics” (18) 
however, the Conservatives are not proposing to increase the personal 
contribution limits (currently $1000) or allow corporate contributions. 
Rather than trying to defend the subsidies as good public policy (if they 
are) or pointing to loopholes in the current regulations, Topp 
misrepresents Harper’s position. Such a stance isn’t likely to convince 
anyone. 
As well, Topp blames Harper for pursuing “high-deficit” policies 
(52) and for “throwing money at old infrastructure projects” (180). In light 
of the NDP’s demands for stimulus spending, this rings rather hollow. 
Certainly, some Conservative spending (on prisons, military jets and the G-
20 summit) and the corporate tax-cuts should be criticized but Topp’s 
blanket condemnation of deficit spending is overblown and self-defeating. 
Topp still refers favourably to the 2005 “NDP budget” passed by the 
Liberals that contained massive military spending increases (36). Does the 
NDP support military spending but not infrastructure spending? Overall, 
the NDP that Topp describes is a mildly centre-left party intent on winning 
elections and influencing public policy, nothing more and nothing less.  
Finally, one must note Topp’s swipes against public sector unions. 
Pointing to the 1999 nurses’ strike in Saskatchewan and the 2009 
municipal workers’ strike in Toronto, he argues that, “Public-sector 
bargaining is one of the progressive left’s proudest achievements in 
Canada. It is also perhaps our greatest gift to the political right, who lie in 
wait for it to destroy our government, and then often find ways to outlaw it 
when they rule” (30). Presumably public sector workers should help elect 
NDP politicians and then thankfully accept whatever thin gruel is offered in 
return. 
These two books provide a very useful discussion of the 
prorogation crisis. The reverberations from these events continue to be 
felt. The coalition continued to be debated and misrepresented during the 
May 2011 federal election. Questions about it dogged Ignatieff while 
Harper was seemingly successful in appealing for a stable majority 
government to avoid another minority government or an NDP-Liberal 
coalition. It is notable that two of the three parties that cooperated in an 
attempt to defeat Harper experienced historic defeats, while the NDP 
achieved a major breakthrough. Layton has succeeded in making the NDP a 
credible challenger for government, yet it is increasingly difficult to 
determine what his party stands for.   
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The election of a Conservative majority government (with 
approximately 40% of the vote), has pushed questions about the coalition 
government and the GG’s power off the immediate agenda. Yet, the 
underlying issues remain unresolved. Political scientists and constitutional 
experts bemoan the lack of public understanding of our British 
parliamentary system. The message is that the system is fine but the 
people are ignorant and inattentive, allowing someone like Stephen Harper 
to abuse his power. Ultimately, however, this is a conservative and 
traditionalist perspective that ignores the limitations of our system. 
Indeed, many coalition supporters were reduced to defending the reserve 
powers of the Crown and clinging to the hope that the governor general 
would say no to the prime minister. If this didn’t make leftists squirm, it 
should have. Rather than educating the public about the glory of the British 
parliamentary tradition, perhaps it is time to think about moving on to 
modernize and democratize our political system. 
The role of the monarchy, as a colonial and undemocratic 
anachronism, should be questioned not reinforced. Rather than quoting 
chapter and verse from Eugene Forsey7 to support the discretionary 
powers of the governor general, the Left should sympathize with those 
Canadians uncomfortable with power wielded by an appointed official on 
behalf of the Crown. To his credit, Topp briefly mentions “replacing the 
governor general with a legitimate, accountable president elected by the 
House of Commons” but points to the difficulty of amending the 
constitution (183).  
 In general, proposals for reform in the face of the prorogation crisis 
have been remarkably timid and this is true for the contributions to 
Parliamentary Democracy in Crisis. Lorne Sossin and Adam Dodek call for 
transparency insisting that “the public has a right to know the basis for the 
prime minister’s request as well as the reason or reasons for the governor 
general’s decision granting the request” (91). Peter Russell and Lorraine E. 
Weinrib argue that it is time to clarify and perhaps codify the 
constitutional principles of our parliamentary democracy. Such tinkering is 
well-intentioned and likely beneficial, but would do little to democratize 
the status-quo.  
                                                 
7
 A constitutional expert and an ardent monarchist, Forsey was also a social democrat and a 
member of the League for Social Reconstruction and the Cooperative Commonwealth 
Federation. He split with the NDP after it recognized Quebec as a nation in 1961and later 
became a Liberal Senator.  
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 Graham White strikes the right tone in pointing out that “the great 
pity of the failure of the coalition initiative lies in the missed opportunity it 
represented for leading the way to substantial and much-needed progress 
towards real parliamentary reform” (150). He rightly asks (151), “does 
anyone seriously think that Parliament ain’t broke?” Yet, rather than 
demanding radical change, White argues that the formation of a coalition 
government would be useful precisely for demonstrating the flexibility of 
the current system. He refers to the “genius” of responsible government 
and describes himself as “an unabashed fan of the Westminster system of 
cabinet-parliamentary government…one of the greatest political 
inventions of all time” (153, 159). Ultimately, he falls back to a position that 
decries public “misunderstanding” and “ignorance” (153, 154).  
 For their part, Leclair and Gaudreault-DesBiens point to a deeper 
“crisis of representation” (111). They argue that “there is an increasing 
disconnect between Westminster-style parliamentary democracy and the 
citizens’ understanding of democracy” (105-106). They do briefly question 
the monarchy’s role in Canada and they present the possibility of “changing 
our democratic system altogether and undertaking a major constitutional 
overhaul” (118). These are ideas that need greater exploration and 
practical development.   
 Neither the social democratic left in the NDP8 nor the broader left9 
in Canada has focused much on these issues beyond the on-going campaign 
for electoral reform. Replacing the single-member plurality system 
remains as fundamental as ever, as evidenced by the May 2011 federal 
election, but it also remains insufficient. Unfortunately, imaginative left 
contributions to discussions of democratization and institutional reform 
remain few and far between (e.g. Resnick 1984; Albo, Langille and Panitch 
1993; Rebick 2000; Evans 2006). The immediate context of the 
prorogation crisis has passed, but the need to think more deeply about 
genuinely radical proposals for democratic participation and governance 
remains. 
 Finally, while there can be little doubt that a Liberal-NDP coalition 
would have been perfectly legal and politically preferable to a Conservative 
government (minority or majority), such a coalition would have been, at 
                                                 
8
 One exception is the fact that the CCF/NDP has, since the Regina Manifesto of 1933, 
advocated abolishing the unelected Canadian Senate. 
9
 Despite the continuing relevance of Marx’s discussion of the Paris Commune of 1871 (in The 
Civil War in France) or Lenin’s conception of “dual power,” the Marxist tradition has little to 
say about transcending the limits of contemporary liberal democratic institutions. 
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best, a mildly left of centre government in no position to challenge 
neoliberalism or democratize the political process. The socialist left should 
not ignore parliamentary politics, but rebuilding the left in Canada must 
also take place beyond the parliamentary arena.   
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